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WHAT CARRIER DOESN'T ADDRESS
Philip J. Weiser*
It is trite to say that "we are all Schumpeterians now." But when it
comes to appreciating the importance of innovation and entrepreneurship,
we are.' Joseph Schumpeter's writings,2 while prescient in many respects,
failed to provide a theory of innovation that lends itself to easy public policy prescriptions.3 By highlighting the role that antitrust law and intellectual property policy can play in spurring innovation, Michael Carrier has
done the field a great service. In short, Innovationfor the 2 1' Century' is
an impressive, ambitious, and important book. Rather than discussing Carrier's contributions, however, this short comment will underscore three
important points his book does not address.
My first critique of Professor Carrier's proposals rests on a concern
that he misreads the doctrinal implications of the Supreme Court's decisions at the intersection of antitrust and regulation. In particular, Carrier
suggests that the Trinko/Credit Suisse double header is, at worst, benign
and, at best, on the money.' Notably, his view of Trinko leads him to predict that the Supreme Court will take an aggressive posture as to "pay for
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Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Professor
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1.
The debate about the nature of innovation, however, features a number of perspectives, with
some commentators quarrelling with Schumpeter's view that the gales of "creative destruction" operate most effectively with a series of successive monopolists fighting for the market. For one alternative
vision of innovation, see Richard N. Langlois, Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential
Facilities:Toward a Schunpeterian Post-ChicagoApproach, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC
POLICY: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION,

AND ANTITRUST ISSUES

193, 207 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001)

("[I]nnovation normally proceeds fastest when a large number of distinct participants are trying multiple approaches simultaneously.").
2.
See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-90 (3d
ed., Harper and Brothers 1950) (1942).

3.
CHRON.

See J. Bradford DeLong, Creative Destruction'sReconstruction: Joseph Schumpeter Revisited,
HIGHER

EDUC.,

Dec.

7,

2007,

at

B8,

available

at

http://chronicle.com/free/v54/i15/15b00801.htm.
4.
MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW (2009).
5.
See id. at 371-73; Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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delay" pharmaceutical settlements that have developed as an unintended
consequence of the Hatch-Waxman Act.6
The problem with Carrier's argument is that it overlooks the most disturbing aspect of Trinko-it made the judgment about the effectiveness of
the regulatory regime (in that case as to the FCC) on a motion to dismiss.
By contrast, this issue was a question of fact in United States v. AT&T7 and not presumed based on the mere presence of a regulatory regime. The
same concern applies to Credit Suisse, which took a generous view of the
SEC's regulatory effectiveness not long after that agency (and the self
regulatory organization upon which it relied) failed to unearth a cartel arrangement at the NASDAQ that was only revealed through antitrust litigation.' But, as Carrier acknowledges,' I have written about this before,
suggesting that the issue is not as clear as he implies.o
My second point relates to the Microsoft antitrust litigation and whether the presence of intellectual property rights (IPRs) should justify a firm's
decision to withhold access to application programming interfaces or protocols necessary to facilitate interoperability. I agree with Carrier's conclusion that IPRs should not displace antitrust oversight." Again, to invoke United States v. AT&T, consider that, had the relevant interconnection issue in that case involved patented interfaces, it would have come out
differently under the theory pressed by Microsoft.12 Particularly in light of
the controversy surrounding software patents," it is hard to justify awarding the recipient of a patent on an application programming interface or
communications protocol a get-out-of-jail free card.' 4
6.
CARRIER, supranote 4, at 373.
7.
United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 223-24 (D.D.C. 1982) (approving the breakup of AT&T and the imposition of equal access mandates to address AT&T's discriminatory practices against long distance competitors and rival equipment manufacturers), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
8.
For the Department of Justice action in that matter, see Antitrust Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Alex Brown and Sons, Civ. No. 5313
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f0700/0739.pdf.
9.
CARRIER, supra note 4, at 372 n.143.
10.
Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory Era, 50
ANTITRUST BULL. 549 (2005).
11.
For my explanation of this point, see Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 15-22 (2002).
12.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (intellectual property no
more confers such a right than the argument "that use of one's personal property, such as a baseball
bat" is immunized from tort liability).
13.
For one example of the criticisms leveled at them, see Feld Thoughts,
http://www.feld.com/wp/
(Apr.
10,
2006),
available
at
http://www.feld.com/wp/archives/2006/04/abolish-software-patents.html.
14.
To be sure, I reject the claim that all intellectual property protection should be denied to
interfaces. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 534 (2003). Rather, I argue that, in some cases, the appropriate strategy is to withhold intellectual property protection as to reverse engineering of such interfaces, thereby imposing a
liability rule in lieu of the traditional property rule. For a broader discussion of the suggestion that, in
some cases, liability rules (which allow access at a price) are preferable to property rules (which
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Given its important status as an antitrust precedent, I would have liked
to see Carrier develop his view of the Microsoft case." Carrier may well
have resisted doing so out of concerns related to space, a lack of historical
distance, or that he was not sure what type of verdict to pronounce on the
decree. Nonetheless, the Microsoft case bears close examination as evidence of the challenges of "regulating interoperability,"" of which the
IPR issues are only a relatively small part of the overall equation.
My final point centers on the role of standard setting organizations
(SSOs). The role of SSOs is potentially very important and, until recently,
they operated with a limited degree of awareness of the regulatory challenges they face as to, among other issues, the threat of patent holdout. As
I have explained elsewhere," there is a strong argument that SSOs should
be given the type of latitude that Carrier calls for in facilitating cooperation and managing the behavior of individual firms. Where Carrier could
drill down deeper, however, is to evaluate the institutional challenges of
how to enforce commitments by firms participating in SSOs that their collection of royalties will be on reasonable and non-discrimination (RAND)
terms. Most question-begging is whether the FTC's Section 5 authority
will ultimately prove to be an important tool in this regard (as used in the
N-Data case 18). After all, in the wake of the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in the Rambus case," there will undoubtedly be more pressure
for the FTC to use this tool.
To be sure, one book cannot address everything. Consequently, these
comments and criticisms do not necessarily highlight shortcomings in Innovation for the 21' Century as much as emphasize the considerable need
for more scholarly engagement and discussion on these issues. In so
doing, this book-and the discussions it sparks-provide more evidence of
a point made effectively by Josh Wright-the challenges in developing
antitrust law are not over and will require continued engagement by those
in practice and the academy in the years ahead.20
would enable firms to deny access altogether), see Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007).
15.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff'g in part and rev'g
in part, and remanding United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000).
16.
Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability:Lessons From AT&T, Microsoft, and Beyond,
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271 (2009).
17.
Philip J. Weiser, Making The World Safe For Standard-Setting, in THE IMPACT OF
GLOBALIZATION ON THE UNITED STATES: VOL. 2, LAW AND GOVERNANCE 171 (Beverly Crawford

ed., 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1003432.
18.
See Decision and Order, In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 0510094 (F.T.C. Jan.
23, 2008), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122do.pdf.
19.
Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cell. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318
(2009).
20.
See Posting of Josh Wright to Truth on the Market, http://www.truthonthemarket.com/ (Apr.
11, 2009, 22:05 EST), available at http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2009/04/11/dont-call-it-acomeback/.

